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PANAMA IN TRANSITION: 
THE ROAD TO 
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY
Rebecca Guzman
No one is born a good citizen; no nation is born a democracy. Rather, both are processes
that continue to evolve over a lifetime. 
— Kofi Annan
Introduction
Because a democracy is a government run
by the people, the people must have confidence
that their government correctly represents
their individual interests. As Aristotle argued,
“If liberty and equality, as is thought by some,
are chiefly to be found in democracy, they will
be best attained when all persons alike share in
the government to the utmost.” (Gowdy) In
simpler terms, Aristotle is discussing the desir-
ability of an equal distribution of power among
citizens for a successful democracy.
The United States is a nation that prides
itself on its alignment with democratic princi-
ples. Over the past 200 years, the United States
claims to have created a system in which power
lies directly in its citizens, giving each and every
person an equal voice. At the same time, the
nation’s history clearly demonstrates that the
road to democracy is a long process of constant
trial and transition.
Panama began a similar transition towards
democracy, starting roughly twenty years ago.
(Furlong, p. 21) In analyzing Panamanian
democracy in the long run, a country like the
United States may serve as a good example
because of its long-term progress; however, in
the short run, looking at younger democracies
will help one to more effectively evaluate how
Panama can continue to make immediate
progress.
Chile, like Panama, reinstated democracy
roughly twenty years ago. (“The Politics of
Policy...” p. 158) Although Panama and Chile
share many similarities, Chile is more readily
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acclimating to democratic ideals. What is the
cause of the fundamental differences between
these two fledgling democracies? What charac-
teristics of Chilean democracy might Panama
find useful? Where does Panama lie in the
democratic process, and how can it continue to
move forward? In this article, I examine
Panama’s democratic progress, looking at both
the successes and the obstacles that confront
Panama today. I include a look at Panamanian
institutions according to the Inter-American
Development Bank’s definition of democracy
and also a look at the relative successes of
Chilean democracy. In this way the issues that
Panamanians face can be identified and possi-
ble solutions suggested.
Panama vs. Latin America: 
A Political Comparison
Certainly a lack of government account-
ability hinders democratic governance. An
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) report
on Latin American democracies, “The Politics
of Policy: Economic and Social Progress in
Latin America,” concludes that in order to prop-
erly analyze democratic transition to more
legitimate and accountable institutions and
leaders, both institutions and policies must be
considered as two inseparable units. The IDB
report further argues that, because of the links
between policies and institutions, neither can
be looked at independently. Rather, policies and
institutions need to be examined together, both
in structure and operation. (p. 257)
Figure 1, taken from the IDB report, refers
to the efficiency of government: i.e., its ability
to govern effectively. This in turn directly cor-
relates with how successful a government is in
demanding accountability. The figure displays
the link between political institutions, policy-
making processes, and policy outcomes among
various countries in Latin America. On the left-
hand side of the table, the countries are
grouped by their Policy Index level. This index
is based largely on how policies represent the
public interest, focusing specifically on the
areas of implementation and enforcement.
(“The Politics of Policy...,” p. 152) Chile is the
only country that has a “very high” policy index.
Panama resides with several other countries in
the “low” policy index category.1
1Not all countries in the IDB report are included in
Figure 1.
Figure 1
Political Institutions and the Qualities of Policies
Country (by
Policy Index
Level)
Very High
Chile 
High
Brazil
Mexico 
Medium
Bolivia 
Peru 
Low
Nicaragua
Panama
Congress
Capabilities
Index
High
High 
Medium 
Medium 
Low 
Medium
Medium
Judicial
Independence
4.60
3.90 
3.30 
1.70 
1.90 
1.60
2.20
Party System
Institutionalization
65
59
67
56
53
70
67
Party System
Nationalization
.90
.64 
.78 
.71 
.50 
.88
.78
Programmatic
Parties 
8.00
2.00 
2.00 
0.00 
0.00 
8.00
0.00
Development 
of Civil 
Service
.59
.68 
.40 
.24 
.16 
.19
.08
Source: Inter-American Development Bank, “The Politics of Policy...,” 2006, p. 152.
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In its discussion of effective political
processes, the IDB notes that there are three
fundamental features of effective government:
legislatures with strong policymaking capabil-
ities, an independent judiciary, and well-insti-
tutionalized political parties. (“The Politics of
Policy...,” p. 9) This is reflected by the several
measures of political and institutional variables
across the top of Figure 1. According to the IDB,
the Congress Capabilities Index measures the
strength of congressional committees, public
confidence in the congress as an institution, the
level of education and technical expertise of the
legislators, and the extent to which the con-
gress is a desirable place for legislators, both as
a good working environment and in terms of
effectiveness. (“The Politics of Policy...,” p. 141)
Judicial Independence measures the ability and
quality of enforcement of prior political and 
policy decisions as reflected in the country’s 
constitution and laws. Thus a strong judiciary
plays an independent role in monitoring the
constitutionality of the executive and legisla-
tive branches of government. (“The Politics 
of Policy...,” p. 147) Party System Instituti-
onalization, Party System Nationalization, and
Programmatic Parties measure the quality of
party functionality to accurately and correctly
represent citizens and their interests. (“The
Politics of Policy...,” p. 142) 
Referring still to Figure 1, Chile and
Panama are similar in only one aspect, Party
System Institutionalization, which is a conse-
quence of both countries’ status as fledgling
democracies. As both democracies grow older,
time will help establish more institutionalized
political parties. The large differences between
the two democracies are explained by other key
characteristics. These are characteristics that
can be changed and modified in the short run.
Both Party System Nationalization and
Programmatic Parties explain the efficiency of
political parties. Chile scored a significantly
higher rating on both indices, suggesting that
government discourse is largely affected by the
strength of political parties. Chile has a high
Congress Capability Index as well, in compari-
son to Panama’s “medium” score, displaying the
relative strength of the Chilean legislative
branch in its integral role as a decision maker.
Another key difference is the significant 
disparity in the Judicial Independence Index;
Chile received a score of 4.6 in comparison to
Panama’s score of 2.0 (on a 7 point scale). 
Panama’s relatively low score, both over-
all and across most individual categories, is
affected by its lack of the three key features of
effective governance in its early transitional
stages. (“The Politics of Policy...,” p. 9) Asses-
sing where Panama lies in accordance with
these three features will explain why
Panamanian government lacks legitimacy and
accountability.
Panama’s Condition: 
An Overview of Political Constraints
Many would argue that Panamanian
democracy was hindered from the beginning.
After the 1989 United States invasion to oust
General Manuel Noriega from his military rule,
the U.S. worked with Panama to establish a
democratic government. (Furlong, p. 20)
Initially, the U.S. appointed Guillermo Endara
to the presidential office under the presump-
tion that he and his government would serve in
the early stages of democratic transition, both
rewriting the constitution, which had original-
ly been drawn up and implemented in 1972 dur-
ing military rule by General Omar Torrijos, and
running a democratic election. (Furlong, p. 24)
However, this is not what happened. Not only
did Endara and his government fear losing
power if an election were called, but powerful
and wealthy political leaders also decided that
it was in “the best interest of the country” to
keep the authoritarian constitution intact,
working instead to create a more democratic
constitution through amendments and reform.
(Furlong, p. 24) 
The people of Panama remained skeptical
about government policy and procedure as a
result. Voters had not elected Guillermo
Endara, so how was he any different than
Noriega? In addition, the constitution had not
changed, because of the interests of a powerful
minority. How could governance change if
democratic ideals and every individual person’s
interest were not at the forefront of the debate?
Miguel Antonio Bernal, a Panamanian political
scientist, argued, “If a new constitution is not
written, then democracy will be threatened
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from the start.” (Furlong, p. 24) A new consti-
tution would serve as an equalizer, because it
would be in the best interest of every citizen,
not just a few. 
Although an authoritarian constitution
can hinder democratic effectiveness (Bernal’s
fear), all hope is not lost. Chilean democracy
has prospered despite its own authoritarian
constitution. Both the Panamanian and Chilean
constitutions established a strong executive
branch, but Chilean democracy has nonethe-
less successfully embodied the three funda-
mental features of government: effective 
political parties, legislatures with strong poli-
cymaking capabilities, and an independent 
judiciary.
Effective Political Parties
Effective political parties are perhaps the
most fundamental necessity in developing an
efficient and accountable democracy. (“The
Politics of Policy...,” p. 9) Political parties must
have an established framework and platform,
enabling the party to be programmatic, insti-
tutionalized, and national. Programmatic 
parties are solid, well-defined political group
entities, focused on the long-term ideals and
reputation of the party rather than the individ-
ual member politicians. This means that it is
the party that is the bargainer because it is the
party that holds the long-term investment.
Politicians who might otherwise seek individ-
ual interests must now work within the party’s
framework and be accountable to the real play-
er, the political party to which they belong.
(“The Politics of Policy...,” p. 142) As noted ear-
lier, the largest disparity between Panama and
Chile is the Programmatic Party Index score.
Chile scored an 8.0 (very high) compared to
Panama’s score of 0.0 (very low). 
In Panama, the lack of programmatic par-
ties is clearly demonstrated by the behavior of
former president Mareya Moscoso and its polit-
ical consequences. Moscoso, a member of the
Partida Arnulfista (PA), granted asylum (a con-
troversial act) to accused Cuban terrorist Luis
Posada Carilles, resulting in allegations that
this was to her personal financial benefit. In
addition, there were also allegations about the
misuse of government funding when an esti-
mated $400 million went missing. (Gaskell, 
p. 1) With the PA’s reputation now tarnished,
Guillermo Endara, after earlier serving as
Panama’s president representing the PA party,
changed his PA affiliation and ran under the
Solidaridad Party in the 2004 presidential elec-
tion.2 When asked about his new affiliation, he
argued that it was due to differences between
him and Moscoso. His party shift suggests that
in Panama political party affiliation currently
has more to do with personal winning strategy
than it has to do with party position and plat-
form. (Alcàntara and Espíndola, p. 533)
In essence, to bring about long-lasting
effective policy-making, in the long term the
individuals in government are less important
than is the party needing to advance its identi-
ty throughout time. (“The Politics of Policy...,”
p. 144) In these early stages of Panama’s tran-
sition to democracy, there has not been an abil-
ity to create and sustain such institutionalized
political parties with programmatic capabilities. 
Legislative Power
Legislative power is another fundamental
key to establishing how efficiently a govern-
ment functions. Although both the Panamanian
and Chilean executive branches of government
are very strong because of their constitutional-
ly defined powers, the Chilean system still has
a strong legislative branch as well, whereas
Panama’s is much weaker.3
Panama is split into nine provinces with
forty-one different legislative districts. For up
to 30,000 constituents in a district there is one
elected representative, and for each additional
10,000 people in a district another legislative
candidate is elected. There are twenty-seven
representatives from single-member districts
and fifty-one multi-member district represen-
tatives. (Singer, p. 637) Urban areas are typi-
cally multi-member districts due to their 
higher population densities; rural areas, how-
ever, are usually single-member districts. Eric
2The Solidaridad Party affiliates itself with the PRD, the
PA’s primary opposition.
3In terms of Congressional Effectiveness, Panama scored
a 1.8, while Chile scored a 3.7, one of the highest scores in
Latin America. See Figure 1. 
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Jackson, editor of the Panama News, notes that
the mixture between single-member and multi-
member districts is problematic. He adds that,
because of multi-member districts, urban slums
(which otherwise would be large enough to
have their own representative) are often drawn
into districts that strongly represent aristocratic
interests and thereby lose much of their iden-
tity in terms of direct representation. (Jackson,
May 17, 2006)
Chile’s legislative districts, in contrast, are
created using a proportional-representation
electoral system. The districts are “bi-nominal,”
which means that two seats are elected from
every district. (“The Politics of Policy...,” p. 161)
The coalition/parties that receive the two high-
est shares of the votes each win one of two seats
available in each district; however, if the first-
place coalition/party wins by more than a two-
to-one ratio, then it can take both seats. In this
regard, if the top vote-getter gets twice as many
votes as its opponent, then it will win all of the
district seats. This inherently creates very
strong coalition incentives. (“The Politics of
Policy...,” p. 161) The coalition incentive is
important because it is the coalition that wins
the election rather than the individual, thus
allowing political parties to become more pro-
grammatic and less individualistic. (“The
Politics of Policy...,” p. 161) 
In Chile, by way of contrast with Panama,
the difficulty of winning an election and the
possibility for “career-legislators” create a
strong and more independent legislative
branch. Legislators are held accountable for
their actions not by the president, but by their
party coalition and most importantly by their
constituents. (“The Politics of Policy...,” p. 162)
This creates a system in which legislators are
more likely to respond to their constituents. In
Chile 60 percent of legislative incumbents were
re-elected in the 2004 election, compared to the
17 percent of incumbents who won in the 2005
Panamanian election. (“The Politics of Policy...,”
p. 162) The high Chilean win rate for incum-
bents allows many legislators to build careers
in government. (“Politics of Policy,” p. 162) As
individual legislators work to successfully
lengthen their careers, they have to prove their
loyalty and accountability to their constituents.
Furthermore, as Chilean legislators must first
be selected from their political party coalition,
the legislators are also held accountable by the
party. Panama’s lack of such an incentive to cre-
ate coalitions or to work towards re-election
negatively affects the efficiency of government.
The Panamanian government’s lack of
cohesiveness is due to concurrent executive and
legislative elections, in which every five years
the entire legislature along with the position of
president are up for re-election.4 Considering
the low incumbent win rate and the inability of
the president to run for two consecutive terms,
any cohesiveness of government is completely
lost every five years as nearly every elected
member of government is new. This lack of
cohesiveness hinders government progress in
two ways. First, the constant arrival of new
politicians in government creates an inherent
instability in government institutions. How can
civilian issues be adequately addressed when
legislators have to constantly keep starting
anew? Secondly, what is the motivation for leg-
islators or the president to satisfy the public if
they know that their chances of re-election are
slim?
Judicial Independence
In terms of promoting democratic effec-
tiveness by holding government institutions
accountable, the IDB recognizes the critical role
that the judicial branch plays. As the IDB report
states, “The judiciary is the most obvious
enforcer in the political system.” (“The Politics
of Policy...,” p. 146) Keeping in mind the insep-
arable link between policies and institutions,
the role of the judiciary as the primary enforcer
of the political system plays a crucial role in
establishing effectiveness in governance. The
2006 Index of Economic Freedom and the U.S.
State Department 2005 Human Rights Report
have both argued that Panama is “mostly free,”
(Kane et al., p. 1) because of problems within
the judicial system. These problems specifical-
ly pertain to harsh prison conditions and judi-
cial corruption. (“Panama: Country Reports…”)
There are systematic problems regarding
4Presidents cannot run for immediate re-election. They
must sit out one five-year term before running for re-elec-
tion.
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enforcement of laws and policies on all judicial
levels, especially because judges are appointed
using a top-down appointment system. The
Supreme Court justices, consisting of nine indi-
viduals appointed by the president and con-
firmed by the legislature, appoint the Superior
Tribunal judges. The Superior Tribunal judges
appoint the Circuit and Municipal judges.
(Hibbitts, p. 1) As Hibbitts explains, this top-
down appointment approach creates a system
“which lends itself to political tinkering and
undue interference by higher-level judges in
lower-level cases in which they often have no
jurisdiction.” (Hibbitts, p. 1) Lower level courts
are categorized by rampant allegations of arbi-
trary judicial decision making. (Kane et al., 
p. 1) To complicate things further, there are
instances in which local courts are run and
operated by judges and lawyers who are serving
without the qualifications to do so, severely hin-
dering due process of law. (Kane et al., p. 1)
Lower courts have also been accused of non-
existent appeal procedures, and there have been
instances of affluent defendants paying fines
while poorer defendants go to jail for the same
offenses. (Hibbitts, p. 1) 
On a larger scale, perhaps the most press-
ing issue that Panama faces in regard to its judi-
ciary is its lack of independence. As the IDB
report states, an independent judiciary can be
a great facilitator, by monitoring politicians and
government officials and holding them to their
commitments and by enforcing constitutional
law and procedure. (“The Politics of Policy...,”
p. 9) 
Panama’s Supreme Court justices are
appointed to serve ten-year terms. (Hibbitts, 
p. 5) With judicial tenure lasting only ten years,
judges are more likely to be influenced by polit-
ical leaders. When Supreme Court judges are
constantly changing, the lack of job security
creates a dependence on politicians holding
office, especially the president. (“The Politics of
Policy...,” p. 147) Life-long terms would create
more job security, allowing judges to be more
concerned with the law as opposed to their pop-
ularity among politicians and government offi-
cials, inherently creating more accountability.
(“The Politics of Policy...,” p. 86) 
Chile exemplifies a Latin American coun-
try that has been able to further promote judi-
cial independence by virtue of its recent imple-
mentation of life-long terms for the judiciary.
As a result, Chile’s Judicial Independence Index
of 4.6 is the second highest in Latin America.
(“The Politics of Policy...,” pp. 86–99) Panama
might well consider emulating Chile’s approach
if it wishes to strengthen its judicial system at
this level.
Demanding Accountability
Keeping in mind the three essential com-
ponents of effective democracy — a strong leg-
islature, institutionalized political parties, and
an independent judiciary — it is necessary to
return to the essence of what it means to be a
democracy. Although these three components
contribute to creating a more accountable
democracy, this only occurs when the power of
the democracy is distributed equally among the
citizens. The people must be responsible for
demanding and working towards implement-
ing these three components. Citizens are
empowered in a democracy only when they
start taking personal responsibility and
accountability for their government and its
actions. Without personal accountability and
the desire to work towards change, however, the
situation will remain static. The limited infor-
mation presented by the Panamanian press to
its citizens is a specific example of an issue that
limits civilian empowerment. Panamanians
must demand press accountability in order to
effectively work towards change.
Freedom of the Press 
Unfortunately, only about five percent of
the Panamanian population reads the newspa-
per, hindering democratic empowerment
because of the strong correlation between
knowledge and power. Many would say that
June 29, 2005, marked a historic day for
Panamanian journalists. On this day “gag laws,”
which criminalized negative press coverage of
public officials and wealthy citizens, were final-
ly repealed. In 2006, however, the government
worked behind closed doors to pass legislation
working against the repeal as President Martin
Torrijos and his Executive Council held meet-
ings to revise Panama’s penal code. (Ornstein,
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p. 1) In March 2007 these new penal code pro-
visions passed through the legislature. These
provisions included shorter sentences for cor-
rupt officials and new laws against freedom of
the press. (Ornstein, p. 1) Jackson argues that
the penal code revision known as injuria
“strengthens immunity from investigation or
prosecution for acts of corruption by politicians
and judges… [and] doubles prison time for
journalists who write true stories that embar-
rass the rich and powerful….” (Jackson,
February 4–17) The revisions, for example, will
make it easier for General Noriega (if he returns
from his U.S. prison later this year) to be a free
man, although he has been convicted of sever-
al crimes and faces sentences of 64 years behind
bars. (Ornstein, p. 1)
Panamanian law also hinders the freedom
of reporting in inadvertent ways. Not only has
strict anti-press legislation resulted in the pros-
ecution of journalists who violate these
restraints, but it has also consequently created
a press where journalists practice self-censor-
ship. As Jackson explains, “In a country where
one-third of journalists have faced criminal
defamation prosecutions, self-censorship has
become rampant.” (“Americas 2001: Panama,”
p. 1) In addition, Panama has a law prohibiting
full-time professors from having other jobs.
Miguel Antonio Bernal, a full-time professor at
the University of Panama, is known for his out-
spoken attacks against the government. This
law, however, is an attempt to try to silence
opposition voices, like Bernal’s or those of other
academics who might wish to serve as public
intellectuals. This explains why Bernal is
banned from writing in almost every national
newspaper and why officials have threatened
multiple times to remove his radio show from
the air. (Bernal) Eric Jackson, owner and editor
of the Panama News, an independent news
reporting service, has openly discussed the gov-
ernment’s control over the newspapers and the
TV stations. He too has faced attacks. His con-
troversial Panama News web page was hacked
into in an attempt to shut it down in early 2007.
(Jackson, March 4–17) Fear of criminal prose-
cution has led to an environment far from 
conducive to a free press, in turn leading to self-
censorship in journalistic practice. Many jour-
nalists who have sought to work openly in the
face of the legislation have suffered for their
efforts.
The lack of freedom of the press has direct
and significant consequence when it comes to
working towards reform and demanding more
from the government. Given its overall demo-
cratic ranking, it is no surprise that Chile has
one of the freest presses in Latin America, while
Panama is still in transition toward freer media
coverage, as is the case in many Latin American
countries. (“The Politics of Policy...,” p. 104) 
Some Negative Consequences of
Panama’s Fledgling Status
Since 1989 there have been many prob-
lems due to Panama’s struggle as a fledgling
democracy. The Panamanian government has
suffered greatly in the eyes of its citizens as a
result of the misbehavior of public officials who
have shown little accountability. A few of the
more egregious examples include the follow-
ing. At the presidential level, Torrijos failed to
make his campaign finance money public, a
clear violation of the Law of Transparency.5
(Gaskell, p. 5) A congressman admitted publicly
to receiving bribes for his approval of govern-
ment contracts and for his vote for specific
Supreme Court nominees. (Bussey, p. 1) At the
judicial level an individual faced allegations
naming him a “fake judge” who falsely claimed
to have studied and graduated from the Law
School of the National University of Colombia.
(Jackson, “High Court Ruling…”) In early 2006
a diploma scandal was uncovered involving the
University of Panama and the issuing of thou-
sands of fraudulent diplomas. (Gaskell, 
pp. 1–6) As Panama progresses toward a more
advanced state of democracy, hopefully gov-
ernment accountability will increase and indi-
vidual interests will be overpowered by the 
public good. 
5The Law of Transparency, which was implemented on
January 22, 2002, states: “Government bodies have the oblig-
ation to publish regulations, general policies, and strategic
plans, internal procedure manuals, and descriptions of orga-
nizational structures. A code of ethics requires that all senior
government officials publish declarations of their financial
holdings, conflicts of interests and other information for
anti-corruption purposes.” (B-5 freedom info.org/
countries/panama)
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Solutions
The obvious solution to Panama’s current
limited state of democracy is to implement the
features of effective governance discussed above,
while also creating a stronger press. It is, how-
ever, important to remember that Panama’s
emergence as a democracy is very recent, and
that emergence itself is an important first step
necessary to establishing a freer and more equal
state. Although Panama is still in an early stage
of transition, there are urgent problems to be
addressed. Panamanians superficially concern
themselves with the issue of corruption, but they
must stop accepting it simply as the way things
are. Robert Taylor quotes Eric Jackson as stating
that “there is no feeling of revolution in the
streets,” despite people’s dissatisfaction with the
status quo. (Taylor, p. 1) Panamanians need to
establish their rule of law together, for each cit-
izen must share in the government. As we are
again reminded by Kofi Annan, democracy is an
evolving process. In this light, Panama’s demo-
cratic status should not be one that harbors frus-
tration, but rather hope and high aspirations for
a brighter future. 
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